Introduction
In 2004, in an article for the Washington Post, King Abdullah II of Jordan voices his concerns over Iranian meddling in the January elections in Jordan and Iraq. In the article, he uses a new term, the Shi'a "crescent," 1 to describe a resurgent Iran and its imminent domination of the Middle East, caused by the destabilizing nature of the American war in Iraq. 2 He voices his fears that Iranian control will spread to other Sunni countries, noting that "even Saudi Arabia is not immune from this." 3 King
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Abdullah's words were largely dismissed as alarmist, 45 This paper will discuss the soft power tools at Iran's disposal and how it has used them to compliment hard power tactics in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf, amounting to an effective use of smart power by a rational international 4 "The Shia Crescendo," The Economist. actor. Iran's use of soft power, designed to appeal to various audiences in the East and the West, has given its military involvement a more multi-faceted and more long-term dimension and represents a foreign policy decision that could greatly improve Iran's political position on the global stage. The limitations, then, on this paper, will be on the discussion of the mechanisms and politics of Iranian military involvement. In-depth analyses will therefore not be afforded to the civil war in Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen, as the focus is on how soft power has complimented Iran's military efforts, rather than on how Iran's hard power, interacting with a plethora of other actors, including Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the United States, has influenced the geopolitical scene.
Smart Power: A Definition
To understand Iran's successful combination of soft and hard power, it is necessary to define both terms. Hard power coerces through tangible resources such as military force or payment, punishing or bribing parties into submission or compliance. 8 Soft power, alternately, is an ability to "convince or persuade others to follow your example, without coercing them, offering them rewards or deceiving them." 9 In essence, it is the ability to convince others to "want what you want." 10 A state using soft power establishes a positive, enviable image of itself that other states or individuals wish to emulate. A lack of the deception associated with hard power also allows the state to establish reliability and lasting trust between itself and other states. Although hard power is oftentimes necessary, soft power "ultimately configures the context within which other nations make decisions in ways that favour the interests of soft power nations." 11 Smart power, then, is the ability to emotionally appeal to groups of people, ensuring their loyalty and consequently convincing them to pursue the same agenda Gallaroti, 250. 73 using the same methods, derived from hard power. 12 Due to the threat of nuclear war and the cost of maintaining sophisticated weapons and armies, the use of smart power is now more important than ever if a state is to succeed on the world stage. The American war in Iraq is a fitting example of a failure to implement a smart power strategy.
Without sufficient attention to soft power, American involvement in Iraq has "increased rather than reduced the number of Islamist terrorists throughout the past five years <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/22/iranian-warships-cross-suez-canal>. 23 Çakmak, 59. 24 Monier, 428. 39 The eruption of conflict in Palestine, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and most notably Syria has provided fertile ground for renewed 34 Çakmak, 54. 35 Siperco.
36 "The Shia Crescendo," The Economist. amounting to the severing of diplomatic ties. 41 At this point, it is hard to say whether there will be a direct conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia or whether there will be a rapprochement in the future. A deeper analysis of Saudi-Iranian relations is, however, outside the scope of this work.
On the note of sectarian competition, a short comment is needed. Scholars have long questioned Iran's ability to control and influence Shi'a communities and have claimed that Iran's soft power is vastly exaggerated. 42 This can be due to differences in language, culture, and practice across Shi'a communities or the historical divide between Arabs and Persians. It is often simply due to long-standing antagonisms between states, such as those between Egypt and Iran. Although it is arguable that Iran's sway over Shi'ites is limited, the existence of ideological rhetoric as a tool to consolidate confidence domestically and project power internationally is undisputable. Sectarian rhetoric allows Iran to legitimize its authoritarian rule and identify and combat real and perceived political challenges, domestically and regionally. Iran's role as the defender of Shi'a Islam, militarily, economically, and ideologically, especially in the face of collapsing states across the Middle East, lends Iran's realpolitik foreign policy a more multifaceted dimension. As long as Iran's conviction in its own soft power product remains strong it will have an effect on oppressed Shi'ite populations and more importantly, on their <http://www.hudson.org/research/9863-the-guardian-of-pakistan-s-shia>. 48 Ibid. 49 Forrest, 115. 50 Ibid. Forces. 68 Iranian funds are also present in Sunni groups, whose activities could lead to opportunities for Iranian consolidation of power, these being the National Defence Force in Syria, the Iraqi Kurds, and Hamas, for example. 69 Iran also offers tacit support to an international web of Shi'ite communities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Yemen. Iran therefore, in addition to seizing power across the Middle East through proxies, has influenced them to seek the same geopolitical and 65 Ibid., 487. 66 Nye, Obama's Smart Power, 7. 67 Forrest, 101. 
